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IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES: BALANCING SAFETY AND
SECURITY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPRESENTATION
Camille Carey and Robert Solomon *

Domestic violence victims often face the impossible choice between physical safety
and financial security. State intervention can offer some protection to victims, but
enlisting the criminal justice system through reporting domestic violence or
restraining order violations can have drastic financial consequences. Involving the
state is likely to lead to sanctions for the abuser which would ultimately deprive the
victim of child support, alimony, and other financial support, which may be the
totality of the victim’s financial resources. To avoid this result, many victims refuse
to enforce court orders intended to maximize their safety. This article examines the
context in which victims must “choose” between physical safety and financial
security and the lawyer’s difficult position when a client prioritizes financial
stability. Using a compelling case study that exemplifies this impossible choice, the
article examines the role of economic dependence in victim decision-making;
reasons why victims avoid protections offered by the criminal justice system; issues
of capacity, competence, and the Rules of Professional Responsibility in representing
victims; the different models of client-centered lawyering and cause lawyering; and
recent social science work on the ability to predict future domestic violence based
on current behavior. The authors view this through the lens of law school clinical
programs, and the experiences of students who work on the cases and what
limitations, if any, there are to clinical representation when the client trades safety
for economic stability.

INTRODUCTION
In 2008, we co-taught a Domestic Violence Clinic at Yale Law School.
Each week, students went to a local domestic violence advocacy center located in a
beautiful, old Victorian house in a nearby neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut,
where they met prospective clients, sitting at a dining room table under a chandelier
in what had once been an upscale dining room.
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Our clinic followed a holistic model in which the clinic students represented
victims of domestic violence in a full range of civil legal problems, including family
law, immigration, tort actions against abusers, mortgage foreclosure, consumer,
landlord-tenant, and tax matters. In our practice, we found that many clients were
forced to balance the issue of physical abuse with the threat of severe financial stress.
The case study we present in this article is not unique. Many of our clients were loath
to enforce existing restraining orders or criminal protective orders, fearing that
enforcement would result in incarceration of the abuser, which would interrupt
financial support. These pressures were particularly severe for victims with minor
children.
We analyze this situation through the lens of one clinic case – examining
the role of economic dependence in victim decision making; reasons why victims
avoid protections offered by the criminal justice system; issues of capacity,
competence, and the Rules of Professional Responsibility in representing victims;
the different lawyering models of client-centered lawyering and cause lawyering;
and recent social science work on the ability to predict future domestic violence
based on current behavior. We also examine the clinical experiences of students who
work on these challenging cases, and what limitations, if any, there are to clinical
representation when a client trades safety for economic stability. This is a wideranging analysis, and we appreciate that we raise more questions than we answer,
but we are looking for ways to better inform representation of clients in dangerous
situations, and we have not found the answers to be easily forthcoming.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405172
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THE CASE STUDY
Sarah had been married to her abuser for 19 years and had two minor
children, ages 10 and 15, when we met her. During the marriage, Sarah had never
been away from home overnight without her husband Tom, although he had taken
several trips with girlfriends. Her husband was extremely controlling. She was not
permitted to work or learn a trade. He owned a business, had substantial earnings,
built a house, paid all the bills, and doled out household money in modest amounts.
The business was labor-intensive and was entirely dependent on his ability to bid on
public contracts and perform strenuous physical labor. If he did not work, the income
stream would end.
Sarah’s husband beat her frequently. On two occasions, she took pictures
of her black eyes and bruises. The only time she went to a doctor, she gave a false
account of the cause of her injuries. She was afraid to take any action that could lead
to her husband’s arrest. Her main concerns were that she be able to pay the mortgage
and household bills and continue to maintain her children’s home and lifestyle.
Two years before we met her, Sarah prepared a pro se divorce complaint.
Connecticut has an unusual procedure, in which a complaint is served before being
filed with the court. When Sarah served her husband in their home, by handing him
a copy, she was afraid of physical violence. Instead, he looked at the papers, tore
them in half, told her she was not getting a divorce, and left the house. She felt
trapped, but assumed that her husband was correct. She believed there was no way
she could pay for an attorney and there was no way she could get the divorce on her
own. It was only after she contacted a domestic violence hotline that she learned that
she might be able to receive free legal services.
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We represented Sarah for three years. During that period, the only time she
was inconsolable was when her husband was arrested, which happened when a
neighbor reported a domestic dispute at Sarah’s home. She told us that the one thing
she could not allow was for her husband to go to jail. She could put up with anything
so long as she could provide for her children, and the only way she could do that was
for her husband to keep working. Although the court had entered restraining orders
and, due to a third party complaint, a criminal protective order, Sarah refused to
enforce those orders. 1
In a remarkably successful multi-day divorce trial in 2009, the court
awarded Sarah over 50% of her husband’s income for child support and alimony, as
well as 100% of the equity in the marital home, valued at $350,000. The evidence
was quite compelling. As just one example, Sarah testified that one morning, on
awakening after a beating the night before, she was exhilarated when she looked in
the mirror, because she had only one black eye, when she expected two.
Family lawyers reading about a “remarkably successful” result in a
domestic violence case will probably smile to themselves, and ask “then what
happened?” Even before the end of the trial, we knew that compliance was unlikely.
At a recess during the last day, when things were not going well for the defendant,
we saw him huddled with his brother, who then made a series of telephone calls.
They conducted their business openly, with an occasional smirk for our benefit. It
was clear that they were planning something, and equally clear that they wanted us
to be worried about it. When our client got home, most of her furniture was missing.

1

We use the term “restraining order” to refer to civil restraining orders – sometimes
referred to as orders of protection or protective orders. We use the term “protective
order” to refer to orders by criminal courts – sometimes called orders of protection,
protective orders, and conditions of release.
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In one sense, we were relieved that the plan was limited to possessions, but we filed
a motion for contempt the next morning. The problem was resolved when the older
son, now 17, drove to his father’s house, convinced his father to help him load the
furniture on a truck, and brought it home.
At trial, the judge had issued a new restraining order, on her own motion,
noting that this was the first time in her twelve years on the bench she had issued a
restraining order without an application. An earlier restraining order had expired, and
Sarah did not want a new order, having experienced panic when her husband was
arrested for violating the order.
Tom continued his attempts to control Sarah. He violated the restraining
order on a regular basis. He came to the house frequently. Sarah refused to take any
action to enforce the orders. He failed to pay alimony and child support, and we
were in court on contempt motions on many occasions, always seeking compliance
with the financial orders, but never raising the restraining order violations. Usually
he showed up at court with a check. Once he brought forty $100 bills. Eventually,
the Court scheduled monthly hearings, requiring that he keep current on payments.
At a post-judgment contempt hearing for failure to pay child support and
alimony, the defendant described a conversation he had with Sarah at the marital
home, noting that he had frequent conversations with her at the house. The judge
was livid, and said she should throw him in jail until he learned the meaning of a
court order.

She suggested that we might need a public defender for the

unrepresented defendant, a sure sign that she was considering jail time. We expected
this issue to arise, and the students were prepared. They found themselves arguing,
strenuously and effectively, that the court should issue additional monetary
sanctions, but not incarceration.
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We had warned Sarah that the restraining order violations were likely to be
disclosed. Sarah remained adamant that she wanted to enforce the financial orders,
but not the restraining order. In fact, the mortgage was in arrears and without access
to support and alimony payments, a mortgage foreclosure was imminent.
The judge expressed fear for Sarah’s safety, a fear that we had lived with
for over two years, with constant self-doubts about our failure to enforce the
restraining orders. We had discussed this as a class and as a litigation team. We had
the benefit of consultation with a psychiatrist specializing in domestic violence
issues, social workers who consulted with Sarah, victim advocates, and a prosecutor
assigned to domestic violence prosecutions. In the end, the students and the authors
agreed that the choice was the client’s, not ours. When the judge raised her concerns,
the students explained and advocated for the client’s position. The judge looked
surprised, and took a recess. When she returned to the bench, the judge allowed the
defendant to remain free and to continue working.
The defendant continued to violate restraining and protective orders and
Sarah continued in her insistence that she wanted us to enforce the financial orders
but to do everything we could to keep her now ex-husband out of jail. Ultimately, he
came to the house one day when Sarah’s friend was visiting. When the friend told
him to leave, the defendant told the friend to mind his own business and pushed him,
causing him to crash into a bookcase and hurt his shoulder. Someone called the
police, they came, and the defendant was arrested. After a lengthy plea bargain, he
pled to five violations of restraining orders and protective orders, and was sentenced
to four years imprisonment.

THE STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE
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When we started writing this paper, we contacted Mary Adkins and
Elizabeth Tullis, the Yale Law School students who represented Sarah throughout
the case study described in this paper. Yale Law School permits first-year law
students to enroll in a clinic, and Mary met Sarah at the outreach site a few weeks
into the spring semester of her first year of law school. Elizabeth worked at Yale’s
Legal Services Office during the summer between her first and second years of law
school and, as part of her responsibilities, represented Sarah throughout the summer.
Both Mary and Elizabeth continued to represent Sarah throughout their second and
third years of law school. (We appreciate that the luxury of having the same students
work with a client for over two years is unusual, but we do not think that changes the
issues.)
After an initial discussion about this paper, Elizabeth wrote us to offer an
extraordinary g-chat that she had with Mary during the representation. The content
has been edited slightly for length, but the words are entirely theirs:

Mary: Tom [husband] comes over a lot, according to Steve [Sarah’s friend]. Steve
was like “He has to go to jail to get his attention.”
Elizabeth: Steve saw him come over? Was Sarah there when Tom came over?
Mary: Yes and she hid upstairs. He has a key.
Elizabeth: Tom came in the house? Did Sarah get the locks changed?
Mary: Yes but it doesn’t matter
Elizabeth: Did you talk to Bob or Camille about any of this?
Mary: No, not yet
Elizabeth: Ok, Maybe Monday or Tuesday. We will have the opportunity to tell
Judge Swienton about this.
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Mary: I don’t think he has the order yet. Whether or not Sarah wants Tom to go to
jail, something has to change in the way she’s been dealing with this, or else Tom
simply won’t stop. He won’t stop.
Elizabeth: I wonder if we could ask for financial sanctions. Sarah really might need
to get used to the idea of him being in jail for a while. We're just no longer in a place
where we can use this to get assets divided, etc.
Mary: I think Judge Swienton is smart and caring
Elizabeth: But even Judge Swienton is going to lose patience at some point and be
like, if he keeps doing these things, and she wants him to stop, he needs to face the
consequences. I just feel like in this case, I am really walking a line between serving
what Sarah “wants” and giving her good legal advice, honest legal advice, about
what her options are and good practical advice, responsible advice, about what I think
she should do, legally
Mary: I think we’ve told her what she has to do legally. She’s not doing it.
Elizabeth: I feel like there’s a certain point in this case, though, where I can’t
honestly be asking for a TRO [temporary restraining order] 2 that she won’t enforce.
Or, there’s not anything I can do if she won’t enforce it. By not allowing us to report
violations we’re not serving her interests, —at least if we think that subjective
assessments of interest in cases like Sarah’s are not all there is. If Sarah thinks that
everything would be fine if she took Tom back, that that was what she wanted, would
we be serving her interest by facilitating that? Or by, say, transferring property to

2

As we mentioned earlier, the previous temporary restraining order had expired and
Sarah did not want it extended. The students reminded her frequently that we could
get another restraining order, but Sarah was consistent in her objections. At the time
of this conversation, however, the restraining order issued by the Court at trial was
in place.
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Tom? I don’t know, I guess I’ve just been feeling really frustrated, to some extent
with Sarah herself.
Mary: I mean I think this is the fundamental question in DV work, right?
Mary: But what she’s asking from us in this particular kind of instance is not action
but inaction, not pushing the violation in front of the court, which is a passive kind
of facilitating I realize, but it’s more palatable to me.
Elizabeth It’s making Tom think she won’t enforce.
Mary: Yeah I know. I mean it makes me really annoyed
Elizabeth: It just feels very hypocritical, when our whole case was premised on “he’s
so abusive and he needs to be away from her.”
Mary: I know. I asked her today if she felt scared of him and she said no, not right
now. I said, well he has the key to the house, you know he’s going to change his
tune at any point and he could hurt you.
Elizabeth: And if at some future point, she does want to enforce, and report him, say
coming to the house, he’ll go to court and say “she’s just mad at me for something
else – I’ve been coming to the house all the time and she hasn’t complained.” Judge
Swienton TOLD Sarah not to have contact with him at the hearing.
Mary: I’m not sure she would have told me today, except Steve was there and he
said it.
Elizabeth: I just feel weird going to Judge S and asking her to enforce child support,
say, but refusing to bring up the other contempt. It suggests that Sarah, like Tom, is
being selective in her respect for the orders. I know that’s not exactly what it is... but
it doesn’t feel right to me, when we put on such a dramatic DV case and emphasized
that this was about getting him out of her life, to tolerate him staying in it in such
blatant ways. Ethically (not legally ethically, just ethically) it is getting to me.
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Mary: I still think there are ways of approaching this that reconcile at least to some
extent her understandable financial fears and his violations of the TRO. It isn’t just
that she’s being irrational. She’s legitimately scared about his incarceration. I mean,
scared for legit reasons.
Elizabeth: No, but she’s not being particularly respectful towards the legal orders,
Mary: Well, right, but they are orders that she asked for.
Elizabeth: Or to the legal framework her case assumed when we decided to present
DV evidence at trial and ask Judge S to rule on it. It would be different if we had not
gotten all those financial orders etc. on the basis of the DV.
Mary: Because those aren’t the priority in her life. She’s thinking about her priorities
which I think are reasonable to a certain extent.
Elizabeth: But Tom’s violation of the RO [restraining order] is a criminal act—
maybe that’s part of the reason this is bothering me. Because literally, legally, by
imposing the RO, Sarah was involving the state, and making it the state’s interest too
Mary: Well she certainly picks and chooses.
Elizabeth: I guess, maybe, I’ve just sort of internalized the basic premise of the
civil/criminal distinction, which is that once you enter the criminal law system, it’s
not just the interest of the victim, but of society that is at issue. Going into the system,
you marshal the resources of the state to protect you, but you also cede some control
of the case to the State.
Mary: I think you really hit the nail on the head when you told her that she can’t
have someone to keep mowing the lawn but not beating her up. Her lifestyle WILL
change. I don’t think she’s accepted that.
Elizabeth: I know. Like she says she’s trying to, but I feel like she’s saying that to
please us.
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Mary: Steve said that there were 30 bags of trash in the garage because Tom kept
saying he’d send the truck via Little Tom to pick up the garbage, but now it’s been
weeks and Steve is like, “I'm going to have to get a UHaul” and their point was that
Tom is so controlling.
Elizabeth: Can’t Sarah just pay for the trash pickup now, since she has money.
Mary: But they took for granted that she was relying on this promise as if it’s still
Tom’s duty to remove the trash
Elizabeth: Which it’s not. It’s complicated.
Mary: I don’t think anyone thinks of it as NOT his house
Elizabeth: I wish I didn’t feel so frustrated.
Mary: Yeah well it’s ok, we’ll figure something out.

THE PROBLEM
Our case study raises several issues. What does client-based lawyering
mean in such a context? It is easy to say that we take direction from the client, but
does it matter that the client is placing herself in danger of serious harm or death, not
to mention using our services to facilitate an ongoing violation of court orders and a
criminal protective order?
The question of the limits of a lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of a domestic
violence victim has gone largely unexamined. Lawyers who work with domestic
violence victims regularly represent clients who continue to be subjected to physical
and sexual violence. These clients might still be in a relationship with the abuser or
may have intentional or unintentional contact with a former partner.

The abuser

continues to perpetrate abuse and the victim, based on the abuser’s prior conduct,
knows that she is likely to suffer further abuse. The lawyer often knows of the
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ongoing abusive conduct, although the client does not always disclose this
information to her attorney. 3 The ongoing abuse can range greatly in its severity,
from minor pushing to lethal violence. We ask if there is a point at which a lawyer
should or can reconsider his or her role in representing the client, especially when
the lawyer’s advocacy increases the likelihood of the client’s exposure to violence.
We are particularly concerned with the lawyer’s limits (if any) when the client is
making decisions that put her at risk of harm.
We view this question through two important, but separate, queries in
examining the lawyer’s role and possible limits—the level of violence and the type
of advocacy requested. First, there might be a level of violence to which the client
is exposing herself that would cause a lawyer to reconsider representation of the
client. Most domestic violence attorneys are accustomed to representing clients who
experience ongoing low or mid-level violence. A typical domestic violence caseload
often also includes some ongoing high-level violence. At what level of violence, if
any, does the lawyer start to question whether the client’s directions accurately
represent her interests? Does the lawyer pause when the abuser uses or poses the
risk of extreme violence or potentially lethal violence? Or does the lawyer continue
advocacy regardless of the risk to the client? We are concerned when the client is
voluntarily exposing herself to a high risk of harm, but it is not clear how we should
best inform our decision about representation when the risk arises.
Second, the client may request that the lawyer engage in advocacy that may
expose the client to additional risk of abuse, which might lead the lawyer to
reconsider representation. For instance, a client may request that the lawyer file a

3

See Pauline Quirion, Why Attorneys Should Routinely Screen Clients for Domestic
Violence, 42BOSTON BAR J. 12, 13 (1998).
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motion to vacate a civil restraining order so that the client may have contact with the
abuser, or the client may ask that the attorney expand representation to represent the
client and the abuser jointly. The focus of this paper and the issue presented by our
case study is when the client asks the lawyer to advocate that the perpetrator not be
prosecuted for an incident of domestic violence or violating a restraining order or a
protective order, even when the failure to prosecute will almost certainly allow for
additional violence. A lawyer might refuse to provide certain types of advocacy
when that advocacy is likely to bring the client harm. We are interested in what types
of assistance might create sufficient concern for the attorney that she would establish
a boundary in the representation.
The question is raised when the lawyer is concerned that following the
client’s directions places the client in physical jeopardy. In no way are we suggesting
that the client’s directions are not rational.

To the contrary, the problem is

accentuated or created by the fact that the client’s reasons are quite rational from one
perspective, i.e. economics, but from another perspective place her in great physical
danger.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY
In our case study, financial factors played a predominant role in Sarah’s
decision not to report violence or restraining order or protective order violations to
law enforcement or the prosecutors’ office.

This is not unusual.

Economic

dependency is commonly cited as the primary reason victims do not separate from
abusers. 4

Victims are often thrown into poverty when they leave an abusive

4
NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN, 166
(1998).
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relationship. 5 Financial reasons often play a primary role in a victim’s decision about
whether to separate from an abuser or seek assistance from the civil or criminal
justice systems. When a victim is not financially independent, separation or pursuit
of criminal remedies can be almost impossible, and victims are almost never
financially independent.
Domestic violence victims are already financial disempowered simply
because they are women. Women experience discriminatory disadvantage in the
paid labor force. 6 Gender discrimination in employment, including hiring, status,
and compensation, 7 and lack of access to credit serve to economically disadvantage
women. 8 Women are also financially impeded in the unpaid labor force. Women
take significantly more time out of the paid labor market to raise children and bear
more responsibility than men for domestic chores, including cooking, cleaning, and
shopping. 9 This unpaid labor results in significant financial loss for women. While
men could compensate women for their domestic labor, or women could seek

5

Id. at 261.
“In 2010, women who worked full time in wage and salary jobs had median usual
weekly earnings of $669. This represented 81 percent of men's median weekly
earnings ($824).” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
WOMEN’S EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF MEN’S IN 2010 (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120110.htm.
7
Id.
8
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1548 (1983).
9
ANGELA HATTERY, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 58, 75 (2009).
6
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compensation from partners for this labor under theories of implied contract 10 or
quantum meruit, 11 this domestic labor remains almost wholly uncompensated. 12
Women are also financially vulnerable because of the role of patriarchy in
the home. Male authority, emboldened by a culture that preferences men, tends to
dominate in the home. 13 Men often exercise male privilege in the home to urge a
partner to opt out of the paid labor market or devote a greater amount of time to
unpaid domestic labor. This private exercise of patriarchy in the home combined
with women’s unequal economic power in society creates compounded financial
vulnerability for all women regardless of whether they are in an abusive relationship.
Victims are also economically disadvantaged due to the dynamics in
domestic violence relationships. Male authority supports the cultural norm of
domestic violence by men against women and normalizes male violence against
intimate partners and its consequences. 14 Domestic violence relationships tend to

10

An implied-in-fact contract is “an agreement … founded upon a meeting of minds,
which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from
conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their
tacit understanding.” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597
(1923).
11
In Latin, quantum meruit means "what one has earned." When used in contract
law, it definition loosely translates to “reasonable value of services.”
12
Olsen, supra note 8 at 1539 (citing SILVIA FEDERICI, WAGES AGAINST
HOUSEWORK (1974)).
13
Murray A. Straus, A Sociological Perspective on the Prevention and Treatment of
Wifebeating, in FROM BATTERED WOMEN - A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 194, 208 (Maria Roy ed.,1977).
14
Id. at 197-199. The cultural norm of men hitting their intimate partners reflects a
history of women as property and society’s perception of men’s superiority over
women, which helps to establish a man’s superiority in individual relationships.
Historically, men have been given the right to use force against intimate partners,
especially in marriage. Until the early 19th century, spousal abuse was largely
condoned. A husband “had the right to whip his wife, provided, he used a switch no
larger than his thumb.” State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 60 (1874). Retreat from statesanctioned spousal abuse was slow; see Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 156 (1824)
(holding that “the husband should still be permitted to exercise the right of moderate
chastisement, in cases of great emergency, and to use salutary restraints in every case
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follow traditional gender roles, with the abuser being particularly attached to his male
privilege. 15 The abuser is likely to insist that his female partner carry most of the
responsibility for “womanly tasks” like housekeeping and childcare. He, on the other
hand, is usually the breadwinner, with breadwinning being central to his sense of
masculinity. 16 When a victim seeks to challenge these gender roles, the abuser reacts
through controlling or violent behavior to protect his financial dominance, reinforce
his male privilege, or further the power imbalance in the relationship. The abuser’s
limitations on his partner’s access to the paid labor force and education creates her
financial dependence on the abuser. This conduct is part of economic abuse that is
generally present in domestic violence relationships. 17 Abusers commonly prohibit

of misbehaviour [sic], without subjecting himself to vexatious prosecutions,
resulting in the discredit and shame of all parties concerned.”); State v. Oliver, 70
N.C. at 61-62 (“If no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor
dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out
the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.”). The Alabama Supreme
Court finally declared spousal abuse to be contrary to law in 1871: “the privilege,
ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her
face, or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities is not now
acknowledged by our law.” Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871). Yet
reprieve for spousal abuse is not just an historical aberration; the common law
doctrine of marital rape exemptions (where a husband cannot legally rape his wife
due to explicit exemptions for marital relationships in the rape statute) is still present
in state laws across the country. While categorical rape exemptions are no longer
present, Jill Elaine Hasday notes that, even today, the marital rape can result in lighter
sentences, additional procedural hurdles for even bringing the case, or sometimes
only apply to a narrower range of crimes. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent:
A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1376, 1482-1486 (2000).
15
See, e.g., David Lisak et al., Factors in the Cycle of Violence: Gender Rigidity and
Emotional Constriction, 9 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 721 (1996); M. Christina
Santana et al., Masculine Gender Roles Associated with Increased Sexual Risk and
Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration Among Young Adult Men, 83 J. OF URBAN
HEALTH 575 (2006).
16
Ross Macmillan & Rosemary Gartner, When She Brings Home the Bacon: LaborForce Participation and the Risk of Spousal Violence Against Women, 61 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 947, 948 (1999).
17
See generally Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic
Violence, 83 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 40, 40-41 (2011).
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their partners from pursuing an education or employment, and abusers usually
control the financial resources of the relationship. 18
For a victim with dependent children, few or no job skills, and little or no
employment experience, leaving an abusive relationship is extremely difficult. 19 The
role of class in a victim’s analysis of whether to separate from an abuser is complex.
Some victims will find financial security in the most basic of shelter and subsistence.
Others associate financial security with a home in a good neighborhood, high quality
education for their children, nice cars, vacations, and other comfortable amenities. 20
Regardless, separation is likely to force a victim into a lower quality of life or
poverty. She may go from living in a house to living in an apartment or from living
in an apartment to living in a domestic violence or homeless shelter. She may have
to move to a less desirable neighborhood, leave a job, or give up her childcare. 21 She
is also likely to lose her ability to buy necessary items for herself or her children and
may be disconnected from her support network. 22 Because of the many effects of
economic deprivation, she may risk losing custody of her children through child
protective services.

18

Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic
Violence, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1-47 (2012). It is important to note that some abusers
lack financial resources. He may be unemployed or underemployed, lack education
or job skills, or be a low-income wage earner. If he is attached to rigid gender roles,
he can be particularly frustrated about failing to provide for his family. The abuser’s
frustration, insecurity, or sense of failure related to his employment status and
financial stability can fuel or provide an excuse for violence. If he is feeling a lack
of control in his financial situation, he may turn to exercising more control in his
intimate relationship through violence. Suzanne Prescott & Carolyn Letko, Battered
Women: a Social Psychological Perspective, in BATTERED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 72, 74, 89 (Maria Roy ed., 1977).
19
Prescott & Letko, supra note 18 at 84.
20
JILL DAVIES ET AL., SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN: COMPLEX
LIVES/DIFFICULT CHOICES, 34-35 (1998).
21
Id. at 35.
22
Id.
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Even for victims who have left their abusers, state intervention can cause
additional hardship. An abuser can lose his job or the prospect of employment due
to arrest, prosecution, or incarceration. The victim is then unable to receive any
financial support from the abuser, be it child support, alimony, or other financial
contributions. Research has shown that victims often seek to opt out of criminal
justice protections because of their limited economic resources. 23 Victims deliberate
whether “they can afford to prioritize prosecution over other more immediate
concerns such as food, employment, and childcare.” 24

For many women, the

incarceration of their abusers means destitution and homelessness for their families.
In addition, many victims may not want to report domestic violence to the authorities
so as to avoid future employment consequences for their abusers. 25 In one survey of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and victim advocates, the “overwhelming
reason” given for victims’ reluctance to participate in the criminal system was the
financial resources of the victim and her financial dependence on the abuser. 26 One
prosecutor estimated that victims give a financial reason for wanting to drop the
charges in ninety-nine percent of the cases; another prosecutor estimated that victims

23

Some scholars argue that recantation is also a product of mandatory prosecution
policies. When prosecutors work in a hard no-drop jurisdiction, “the battered
woman’s preference is irrelevant, except to the extent that she helps, or does not help,
win the prosecutor’s case. In these situations, prosecutions are pursued against the
batterer by forcing the woman to testify, sometimes leading to recantation, blurring,
or rearrangement of the facts by the victim.” Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight:
A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More
Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 186 (1997).
24
Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 823 (2001).
25
Kimberley D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is
Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255,
1281-1282 (2010).
26
Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced
to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
383, 387, 392 (2001).
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will cite financial reasons for requesting that the charges be dropped in fifty-percent
of cases. 27
Many victims are put in the position of “choosing” between receiving
financial support from the abuser and reporting an incident or a violation of a
restraining order or a protective order. An abuser who is arrested or prosecuted may
lose wages or his employment, and an incarcerated abuser is unable to engage in
meaningful employment.

If the victim is receiving child support or alimony,

criminal court intervention might terminate this support as a result of penalties to the
abuser. The victim’s economic dependence on the abuser often makes her reluctant
to prosecute. 28

Additionally, because of financial abuse in domestic violence

relationships and gender bias in society, victims often are not in a position to be
financially self-sufficient. 29

The involvement of the state can have serious

consequences to a domestic violence victim’s financial stability. The quagmire
created by state intervention can pit a victim’s interests in financial security against
her interests in safety.
We do not suggest that a victim is truly “choosing” between economic
security and physical safety. The choices available to domestic violence victims are
limited and complicated by coercion, the threat of harm, and imperfect options, and
we use the notion of “choice” guardedly. Our case study offers an opportunity to
examine the “choice” of financial security over self-protection when reporting
domestic violence incidents and violations of restraining orders and protective orders

27

Id. at 392.
Robert C. Davis et al., Research Notes, Increasing Convictions in Domestic
Violence Cases: A Field Test in Milwaukee, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 61, 62 (2001) (citation
omitted).
29
Id.
28
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would negatively impact a victim’s financial security. Further inquiry into criminal
justice policies regarding domestic violence reveals why a victim might “choose”
financial security over personal safety.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MANDATORY POLICIES
Victims are often reluctant to enlist the assistance of the police or the
criminal justice system because that system and its consequences are largely out of
their control. Reporting an incident of domestic violence can operationalize the
criminal justice system, but so too can reporting a violation of a civil restraining
order. All fifty states treat violations of civil restraining orders as a criminal matter. 30
In our case study, Sarah asked us to engage in advocacy that would put a stop to
criminal proceedings. In one instance, she asked us to plead with the prosecutor to
not pursue charges against Tom. In another, she begged us to persuade the family
court judge to not report Tom’s violation of the restraining order. Throughout the
relationship, Sarah claimed that her domestic violence injuries resulted from all
manners of clumsiness so as to avoid the possibility of prosecution. Sarah’s situation
is hardly unusual. Mandatory arrest and prosecution, warrantless arrest, and other
problems with the criminal justice system lead many victims to try to “opt out” of
criminal remedies.

30

Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM & MARY L. .REV. 1843, 1860 (2002); see also David M. Zlotnick,
Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to
Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1153, 1194 (1995). Individuals
who violate civil restraining orders can also be penalized through civil or criminal
contempt proceedings. Id. at 1994-1995.

21

IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES

Mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution policies drive state
intervention in domestic violence situations in many jurisdictions. 31 Mandatory
arrest policies require law enforcement to make an arrest when there is probable
cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred, regardless of the victim’s
preferences. 32 Mandatory prosecution policies generally require the prosecutor to
pursue charges against the abuser if there is evidence of a crime of domestic violence
regardless of the victim’s desire to pursue prosecution. 33 Mandatory prosecution
policies, sometimes called “no-drop policies,” are often characterized as “hard” or
“soft” no drop policies. 34

Under hard policies, given sufficient evidence the

prosecutor proceeds regardless of the victim’s preferences, perhaps even compelling
the victim to participate in the prosecution. 35 Under soft policies, a prosecutor may
decide to forego prosecution in certain circumstances, and victims are not forced to
participate in the prosecution. 36 Even in jurisdictions without mandatory intervention
policies, the victim’s interests and concerns are supplanted by those of the state.
Mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution policies can play a substantial
role in a victim’s decision about whether to involve police or the criminal court. In
a mandatory arrest or prosecution jurisdiction, if a victim reports a domestic violence
incident or restraining or protective order violation, the state moves toward arrest
and prosecution, even if arrest or prosecution are not favored by the victim or in the

31
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2004).
32
Coker, supra note 24, at 802 n.5, 806.
33
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1863 (1996); Coker, supra note 24,
at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23.
34
Hanna, supra note 33; Mills, supra note 23.
35
Hanna, supra note 33; Coker, supra note 24, at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23.
36
Hanna, supra note 33; Coker supra note 24 at 802 n.5, 806; Mills, supra note 23.
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victim’s best interests. Even in jurisdictions that do not follow mandatory arrest or
prosecution policies, reporting an incident of domestic violence or violation of a
restraining or protective order often will initiate state involvement.
Policy arguments over whether mandatory policies are the right approach
to domestic violence are heated. Proponents of mandatory policies argue that
mandatory policies are necessary because they: require otherwise reluctant
prosecutors to follow through with prosecution; 37 ensure uniform treatment of
domestic violence crimes even when the victim does not cooperate or want the
criminal case to proceed; 38 remove the burden of choosing whether to prosecute from
the victim;” 39 and reduce racial discrimination in the criminal justice system by
seeking to ensure that all perpetrators, regardless of race, are treated similarly. 40
Opponents of mandatory intervention believe that these policies do not
serve the larger goal of ending domestic violence, deny the needs of individual
victims, and even supplant the control of the abuser with the control of the state. 41
Opponents are concerned that these universally applied strategies: do not account for
the reasons women stay in abusive relationships; 42 ignore the “overriding financial,
cultural, or emotional issues that plague battered women’s lives”; 43 force a decision

37

Hanna, supra note 33, at 1860.
Id.
39
Id. at 1852, 1865.
40
Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV 550, 564 (1999).
41
See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(2009); Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Women’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and
No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 281 (2003); Mills, supra note 23.
42
Mills, supra note 23 at 187-188.
43
Mills, supra note 23 at 185.
38
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on victims without taking into account their individual needs; 44 and disempower
victims and strip them of their autonomy. 45
Laws providing for warrantless arrest in domestic violence cases also create
situations in which cases may be prosecuted against victim wishes. Prior to the
domestic violence movement’s legal reform efforts, 46 the typical police response to
domestic violence was to tell the husband or boyfriend to “take a walk around the
block.” 47 Police often did not have the legal authority to make an arrest at the scene
of a domestic violence crime. 48 Now all fifty states allow an officer to make a
warrantless arrest when the officer has probable cause to believe that an abuser has
committed a misdemeanor or violated a restraining order. 49 This means that the
criminal justice system can be operationalized even if a domestic violence victim
does not report an incident or call the police. A neighbor’s phone call or a police
officer’s viewing of an incident could be enough to initiate arrest or prosecution.

44

Id.
Id.; Opponents believe that the state’s indifference to the victims themselves is
“harmful, even violent.” Id. at 187-188.
46
Mandatory intervention policies are the product of years of criminal justice reform
fueled by the domestic violence movement and feminists, with the perceived
interests of domestic violence victims driving the reform efforts.46 This reform has
taken place only since the late 1960s, when the battered women’s movement began
launching concerted efforts. “The battered women's movement was an outsider
movement, a grassroots movement that developed from the civil rights and feminist
movements of the 1960s. Many feminists saw battering as the product of patriarchy,
as male control over women. . . . The movement developed shelters, safe houses, and
alternative institutions. Groups rejected governmental funding for battered women's
services and programs. Despite ambivalence about the government's role in
protecting battered women, ‘engaging with the state’ emerged as a principal strategy
of the battered women's movement in the early 1980s and developed over the next
two decades.” Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 499, 500-501 (2003).
47
Hanna, supra note 33, at 1858.
48
Id. at 1859.
49
Id.
45
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Involving the criminal system can have other negative consequences for
victims, including sanctions when a victim has contact with an abuser who is subject
to a restraining order. Victims have been held criminally liable for aiding and
abetting an abuser in violating a restraining order when the victim has had contact
with the abuser. 50 Victims have also been held in contempt for having contact with
an abuser when a restraining order is in effect. One Kentucky judge held two
different victims in contempt for having contact with an abuser subject to a
restraining order. 51 The judge fined one victim $100 and the other $200 as a penalty
for contempt. 52 Other judges in Kentucky have incarcerated women because they
contacted their husbands when a restraining order was in effect. 53
Victims may also be compelled to participate in criminal proceedings
against their will by subpoena, threatened incarceration, or other means. 54 For
example, in State v. Finney, 55 the prosecutor subpoenaed the victim– who had been
raped by her husband – and then threatened her with arrest if she failed to testify.
During her compelled testimony, the victim indicated that she had been harassed and
intimidated by the prosecutor. She stated that she did not want to testify but that she

50

See, e.g., Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa
1995); But cf., N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000);
State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St. 3d 1, 795 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 2003); See generally, Marya
Kathryn Lucas, An Invitation to Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic
Violence Liable as Accomplices When They Invite Violations of Their Own
Protective Orders, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 763, 774-778 (2004).
51
Francis X. Clines, Judge’s Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in
TIMES,
Jan.
8,
2002,
available
at
Kentucky,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/08/us/judge-s-domestic-violence-ruling-createsan-outcry-in-kentucky.html.
52
Id.
53
Stephanie Simon, Judges Push for Abused to Follow the Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2002, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/22/news/mn-24141.
54
See, Kirsch, supra note 26, at 402-406.
55
591 S.E.2d 863 (N.C. 2004).
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was afraid not to and that she believed the prosecutor would ensure she was arrested
immediately after leaving the courtroom for her failure to testify. 56 In Tejeda v.
State, 57 the trial court judge ordered the victim to remain in the courtroom in case
the court needed her and stated, “If you leave, you’ll be in contempt of Court and I’ll
have you put in jail.” 58 The court also threatened that the court and the police would
not assist her in the future as a result of her reluctance to testify. 59
Victims also may experience penalties or harassment from the criminal
system for “recanting” or committing perjury. 60 In State v. Spraggins, the victim
requested that the charges be dismissed and asserted that her earlier statement about
a domestic violence incident was false. 61 The victim was subpoenaed to testify, and
during cross-examination of the victim, the trial court stated in the presence of the
jury, “So let me see if I’ve got this all straight. We’re here trying this case because
you are a liar. Is that correct? Do you want to answer the question yes or no? We
are here going through this, trying this case because you are a liar, is that correct?” 62
In State v. Hancock, the wife recanted at trial despite prior written and videotaped
statements to the contrary. 63 The trial court threatened to send her to prison for five
years for perjury and went on to say, “So, either he goes or you go, what is it going
to be. You got kids?... What is it going to be? Who is going to jail, you or him?” 64

56

Id. at 865.
905 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
For a discussion of the reasons victims recant, see Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning
a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 163-75
(2009). Professor Rutledge advocates that some victims should be prosecuted for
perjury. Id. at 182-94.
61
No. 82170, 2003 WL 22971050, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 18, 2003).
62
Id. at *2.
63
No. C-030459, 2004 WL 596103, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App., March 26, 2004).
64
Id. at *2.
57
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It is no wonder that victims often try to opt out of the protections provided
by the criminal justice system. “Attrition dismissal rates” in domestic violence cases
are extremely high. 65 A series of studies have shown that victims fail to participate
in criminal cases arising from domestic violence in about 60% to 80% of cases. 66
Such attrition may occur as a result of a victim dropping charges or recanting. 67
Other modes of noncooperation include failure to cooperate with the police at the
time of law enforcement intervention, sign the complaint, meet with the prosecutor,
and appear at court hearings. 68 One study found that judges, lawyers, and other court
personnel perceive that 56 percent of domestic violence victims will only testify if
subpoenaed. 69 These same individuals observed that thirty-one percent of victims
change their minds about the abuser’s guilt, and thirty-one percent undermine the
prosecution’s case. 70 Experts on domestic violence – including psychologists,
counselors, law enforcement officers, shelter employees, and victim advocates –
regularly testify that it is common for domestic violence victims to recant. 71

65

EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 87 (1996) (internal citations omitted); But see, KARIN V. RHODES
ET AL., VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROSECUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11 (2011) (finding that
victims have a strong preference for mandatory prosecution with or without the
victim’s participation).
66
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 87.
67
Id.
68
Maureen McLeod, Research Note, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution of
Domestic Assault, 21 CRIMINOLOGY, 395, 400 (1983).
69
Jennifer L. Hartman & Joanne Belknap, Beyond the Gatekeepers: Court
Professionals’ Self-Reported Attitudes About and Experiences with Misdemeanor
Domestic Violence Cases, 30 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 349, 361 (2003).
70
Id.
71
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as
Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002); See Audrey Rogers,
Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From
Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 78-83, 87-91 (1998);
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Some victims eschew criminal system involvement by trying to avoid
intervention at all. A staggering amount of domestic violence goes unreported. One
study indicated that 55% of intimate violence is never reported to the police. 72
Another study found that less than 10% of seriously injured women report abuse to
the police and even fewer report if they are subjected to but escape serious injury. 73
In yet another study, about 47% of victims tried to opt out of the criminal system
before the case was even brought to the attention of the prosecutor’s office. 74
Victims are instead turning to the family law system where they are requesting civil
restraining orders in droves. 75 The extent to which victims realize that this civil
remedy becomes criminal after its violation is unknown.
The victim may not want to involve the criminal justice system because of
inadequacies in or complications created by that system or because the system does
not meet a domestic violence victim’s needs. 76

The high rates of victim

nonparticipation are unsettling and indicate the problematic nature of the criminal
justice system for domestic violence victims. If the system successfully addressed

Jennifer Gentile Long, Explaining Counterintuitive Victim Behavior in Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault Cases, 1.4 THE VOICE 2-3 (2006).
72
McLeod, supra note 68, at 400 (citing U.S. Department of Justice, Intimate
Victims: A Study of Violence Among Friends and Relatives (1980)).
73
Id. (citing LENORE WALKER, BATTERED WOMEN (1979)).
74
McLeod, supra note 68, at 405.
75
JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND
LIMITS 24 (1996) (describing civil restraining orders as “the primary source of legal
sanction and protection for battered women”); Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil
Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of “Efficacy”,
11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 361, 376 (describing civil restraining orders as the “most
attractive” remedy for domestic violence victims).
76
Law enforcement does not always enforce protection orders, for example. In 1984,
Tracey Thurman was awarded $2.9 million after suing the Torrington, Connecticut
Police Department and twenty-four city police officers on the grounds that the city's
policy and practice of nonintervention and nonarrest [sic] in domestic violence cases
was unconstitutional” on Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds.
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524 (D. Conn. 1984).
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domestic violence, victim engagement would be much more prevalent. 77 The
criminal justice system has emerged as the primary domestic violence intervention
strategy, 78 and it is failing victims. There is some indication that victims are now
deterred from calling the police because of the victim’s loss of control over the
situation. 79
Victims may avoid participating because treatment of them by judges,
lawyers, and other court personnel further compound the inadequacies of the
criminal system. Victims who do not cooperate or do not separate from the abuser
are viewed by some judges and lawyers as “pathetic, stupid, or even deserving of the
abuse.” 80 Victims who do cooperate are seen by these same actors as “vindictive,
crazy, or falsely charging domestic violence to meet their own selfish needs.” 81
Victims also may be reluctant to cooperate because of the abuser’s control, the
abuser’s threat of violence, or the victim’s fear of retaliation. 82 The victim may be
terrified that the abuser will harm her, family members, or loved ones if she
cooperates. 83

77

Bailey, supra note 25 at 1281-1282.
Deborah Weissman, The Personal is Political–and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 402 (2007).
79
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 51, 163.
80
Hartman & Belknap, supra note 69, at 363.
81
Hartman & Belknap, supra note 69, at 363.
82
Kirsch, supra note 26, at 393-396. See Laura Dugan et al., Do Domestic Violence
Services Save Lives?, 250 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 20, 24 (2003) (finding an increase
of femicide of married white and unmarried black women and an increase in
victimization of unmarried white women when a prosecutor pursued protective order
violations). But cf. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in
Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003) (finding that domestic violence arrests decrease
the risk for femicide).
83
Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 953, 958 (1999); But cf., RHODES ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 10 (finding that there is not an increase in victims’ visit to the
emergency department during or after prosecution).
78
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Victims may have had negative interactions with law enforcement that
further deter involvement. Research has repeatedly shown that abusers are arrested
infrequently for domestic violence incidents. 84 Victims may not participate because
they may not perceive the conduct as criminal or abusive or believe that it is a
personal matter. 85 Victims may be hindered by not understanding how the system
works, or they may have logistical barriers to participation such as not having
transportation, time, money, or childcare. 86 They may fear that the abuser will
retaliate by reporting the victim to child protective services and alleging abuse,
neglect, or substance abuse. 87

Victims may suffer from post-traumatic stress

disorder created by the abuse that makes it difficult or impossible to cooperate. 88
Race, culture, and sexual orientation may also play a role in a victim’s
decision as to whether to enlist the criminal justice system. 89 Women of color may
choose not to call the police due to racism in law enforcement or because of a
community ethic against state intervention. 90 Women of color are also less likely to
have contact with a prosecutor, want to press charges, or want prosecution than white
women. 91 Gay, lesbian, and transgender victims may avoid the criminal system
because of prior negative experiences with law enforcement or the courts or due to
fear of reprisals from the system. 92

84

BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 51, 53.
Id. at 45.
86
RHODES ET AL., supra note 65, at 48.
87
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 65, at 45.
88
Id.
89
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991).
90
Id.
91
RHODES ET AL., supra note 65, at 7-8.
92
See, Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and
Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990); DAVID ISLAND &
85
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This paper focuses on the role of economic security in a victim’s decisionmaking. We concentrate on the economic pressures that make it difficult to leave but
recognize that financial matters represent one piece of a complicated picture, and we
are concerned with isolating any single factor in what is often a multi-faceted
decision. However, other factors—including fear of separation assault, risks due to
immigrant status, and love for or attachment to the abuser—also may feature
prominently in a victim’s decision about whether to enforce a restraining or
protective order or report an act of domestic violence. At the risk of raising new
questions that we do not attempt to answer, we briefly address issues related to
separation assault, immigration and immigrant status, and the role of love or
attachment.
Separation Assault
An abused woman may decide not to involve the criminal justice system
because of the threat of violent retaliation by the abuser. When a victim separates or
decides to separate from her abuser, the risk of violence escalates. 93 This “separation
assault” is “the particular assault on a woman’s body and volition that seeks to block
her from leaving, retaliate for her departure, or forcibly end the separation.” 94
Victims will often postpone leaving the abuser fearing this separation assault. 95
Women will only choose to separate or pursue criminal justice protections if it seems

PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY
MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1991).
93
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991); Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of
Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response from Battered Women, 68 FLA. B.J.
24 (1994) (quoting Mahoney, supra at 94).
94
Mahoney, supra note 93, at 6.
95
Id. at 65-93.
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possible or safe to do so. 96 Domestic abuse is most likely to become lethal when a
victim separates from her abuser. 97 The risk of homicide to a victim cohabitating
with an abuser intensifies after separation. 98 In 56 percent of intimate partner
femicide (or the murder of women) cases, the abuser and victim were separated on
the day of the murder. 99 Separation was the “immediate precipitating factor” in
forty-five percent of intimate partner femicides. 100
Immigration and Immigrant Status
Noncitizen women may be even less likely than citizens to involve the
criminal justice system because of cultural beliefs, language limitations, or other
barriers. 101 Immigrant women tend to feel more pressure to live up to cultural ideals
and fear that separation is disloyal to their culture and will lead to community
stigmatization or sanctions. 102 A victim might not be able to speak or be literate in
English, and interpretation in the woman’s language may not be available through

96

Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59,73-74 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
97
Id. at 79.
98
Campbell et al., supra note 82, at 1092.
99
George W. Bernard et al., Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271, 274 (1982). In fact, a victim’s chances of
being killed by her intimate partner increases by a factor of four when the worst
incident of abuse in the relationship was triggered by a prior attempt by the victim to
leave the relationship. The odds of being murdered increase by a factor of five when
the worst incident was triggered by an attempt to leave the abuser for another partner
or by the abuser’s jealousy. Campbell et al., supra note 82, at 1092.
100
Carolyn Rebecca Block, Risk Factors for Death or Life-Threatening Injury for
Abused Women in Chicago, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,
II-4-6, NCJ 199732 (2004).
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See, Edna Erez & Carolyn Copps Hartley, Battered Immigrant Women and the
Legal System: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV.
155 (2003).
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Yvonne Amanor-Boadu et al., Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Women: Factors
that Predict Leaving an Abusive Relationship, 18(5) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
611, 613 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
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the criminal justice system. 103 Immigrant women also face greater financial risks in
separating from an abusive partner. 104
Immigrant victims rarely call the police, 105 in part because of possible
immigration consequences for their non-citizen abusers. A conviction for domestic
violence or violating a restraining order is a removable offense, meaning that the
abuser can be deported on that basis. 106 For some victims, removal of the abuser is
a positive development that lowers or eliminates the risk of future violence. 107
Others do not want to begin a course of conduct that may result in the abuser being
deported. If the abuser is the parent of the victim’s children, the victim may not want
to sever the parent-child relationship through the abuser’s removal. The victim may
be receiving financial support from the abuser through child support, alimony, or
other means, and the abuser’s deportation would mean almost certain cessation of
that support. Finally, for emotional reasons, the victim may not want the abuser to
suffer such a severe penalty as removal. 108
A victim may also choose not to report abuse fearing her own adverse
immigration consequences. 109
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element of risk when interacting with law enforcement. 110 Some jurisdictions, like
Arizona, require law enforcement to verify the immigration status of any person
suspected of being undocumented. 111 While some jurisdictions do not inquire about
the immigration status of victims, 112 every time a victim interacts with law
enforcement there is some chance that she will come to the attention of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Love and Attachment
While beyond the scope of this paper, love or attachment can be controlling
factors in a victim’s decision whether to report an abuser’s behavior or terminate the
relationship.

113

Victims are often emotionally attached to their abusers and

sometimes do not want to see them incarcerated or punished. These emotions can
lead victims to continue contact or a relationship with the abuser. Victims may
rationalize the abusers’ behavior, attributing it to substance abuse or a troubled
childhood. 114 Reporting abusive conduct or terminating contact with the abuser may
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require the victim to give up a fantasy of a healthy relationship with the abuser. 115
The role of love in a victim’s decision even can trump economic factors in a victim’s
decision about whether to separate or report abuse. 116 As one prosecutor stated,
“[T]hey love the person. They’re afraid that going forward will break up their
relationship, and most of the time they don’t want to break up.” 117
Within the litany of reasons why domestic violence victims would avoid
criminal justice interventions, financial dependence on the abuser remains the
primary reason that victims opt out. 118 Research reveals the significant financial
impact incarceration has on families, regardless of the reason for the incarceration.
As early as 1928, families of incarcerated individuals were found to have suffered
financially “to the point of scarcely being able to ‘eke out an existence.’” 119 Today,
a parent’s incarceration creates significant economic deprivation to families. 120 This
deprivation is largely due to the loss of income that the incarcerated parent may have
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provided to the family but also includes lost “informal contributions” like child care,
social support, and the purchase of toys and diapers. 121
Incarceration can compromise the well-being of remaining family members
and require family members to make sacrifices. Custodial parents may have less time
or money to invest in their children. 122 They may be required to take on additional
employment which results in increased child care costs. Older children may be
required to leave school and enter the job market to supplement household income. 123
In addition, the loss of a parent and the financial difficulties that result from
incarceration can cause children to suffer from a range of emotional, psychological,
and behavioral problems. 124
It is from within this morass that victims ask their attorneys to advocate or
not advocate on their behalf. When the victim is faced with so many potential
negative consequences, it is no wonder that victims ask their attorneys to help them
avoid state intervention even when their safety is at risk. The lawyer is then left to
question whether she should engage in the requested advocacy (or non-advocacy)
and if it is ethically or morally responsible to do so. We turn to the issues of capacity
and competence and the rules of professional responsibility for guidance about the
extent to which an attorney is bound by a victim-client’s decision.

COMPETENCE, CAPACITY, AND THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
There are many reasons why a victim would choose not to involve the
criminal justice system when an act of domestic violence has been committed or a
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restraining order or protective order has been violated. For many victims, the
decision not to leave an abuser or request state intervention is calculated and largely
rational. The victim considers competing concerns and decides whether the factors
weighing in favor of acting outweigh those supporting inaction. The weighted factors
differ by victim, and the calculation for each individual is personal. In our case study,
as in many, Sarah’s decisions were well reasoned and resulted from a complex
balancing of pros and cons. Nonetheless, some question a victim’s “competence” or
“capacity” to make decisions when those decisions involve exposure to harm.
There has been little discussion of the “competence” and “capacity” of
domestic violence victims to make autonomous, rational decisions and have the
agency to realize those decisions. 125 For some, that a victim would “choose” to stay
with a perpetrator indicates clouded judgment. Society treats a victim’s decision as
to whether to leave an abusive relationship as evidence of her competence. 126
Sometimes the question of whether a victim is competent is framed in terms of legal
competence, meaning a legal standard relating to a person’s mental ability to
understand problems and make decisions. 127 Some argue that victims may not be
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competent to make decisions consistent with their values and priorities if they are
too afraid of their abusers. 128 Others claim that domestic violence victims make
inauthentic choices due to duress, arguing that victim decision-making is controlled
by fear of the abuser and desire to avoid retaliation. 129 Because of this duress, the
victim is not able to make decisions serving her own best interests. 130
Some commentators have argued that domestic violence victims do not
have the “capacity” to make decisions with legal consequences. While “capacity”
and “competence” are similar and often are used interchangeably, 131 they are distinct
concepts. Competency generally refers to a legal standard that is required to
complete a legal task. 132 To be competent, an individual’s capacities or functional
abilities must be sufficient for the context in which a decision is being made. 133
Capacity, on the other hand, speaks to an individual’s level of psychological
functioning. 134

128

Psychological or psychiatric evaluations can determine an

Beck & Frost, supra note 127, at 28.
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individual’s capacity to make rational decisions, understand complex concepts, or
understand the nature and effect of one’s acts. 135
The Comment to Rule 1.2 notes that Rule 1.14 controls “[i]n a case in which
the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity….” 136 Rule 1.14 137 considers
this messy notion of “diminished capacity.” Rule 1.14(a) states that capacity may be
diminished “because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason.” 138
This definition is very broad and could arguably extend to some victims, especially
given the catchall phrase “for some other reason.”
In a case of diminished capacity, the lawyer may take reasonable action to
protect the client. Rule 1.14(b) provides that “[w]hen the lawyer reasonably believes
that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or
other harm unless action is take and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest,
the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting
with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client
and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator or guardian.” 139
Professor Ruth Jones asserts that some domestic violence victims should be
appointed legal guardians due to capacity issues. 140 For Jones, some domestic
violence victims are “unable to act on their own” and “require an intervention that
permits someone else to act on their behalf to protect them from their abusers until
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they can protect themselves.” 141 She argues that guardianship of a victim may be
necessary when the abuse has deprived the victim of the ability to exercise
independent judgment. 142

This guardianship would remain in effect until the

abuser’s control of the victim is removed and a victim can make decisions for
herself. 143 The guardian could obtain public benefits and obtain and enforce a
restraining order on the victim’s behalf. 144 The guardian could also restrict the
victim’s contact with the abuser and forcibly remove the abuser from the shared
residence or move the victim into separate housing. 145 The desired outcome of the
“aggressive intervention” of a guardianship is for the victim to decide to end the
abusive relationship. 146
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota addressed the capacity of a domestic
violence victim in a conservatorship case, where the victim refused to seek a
restraining order. In In Re Conservatorship of Barbara J. Frarck, a Minnesota
appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision to appoint a conservator for a
domestic violence victim. 147 Barbara Frarck was in an abusive relationship and
suffered from borderline personality disorder. 148 The court wrote that “[d]espite
being physically abused by [her boyfriend], Frarck remains involved in their
relationship” and that the testimony “indicated that if a conservator were appointed
and sought a restraining order, Frarck could be protected from his abuse.” While the
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court appointed a conservator based on both the domestic violence and Frarck’s
mental condition, the court focused more on the domestic violence in concluding that
a conservatorship was appropriate. The court stated that, “Frarck’s continued threats
to move in with her boyfriend, despite his abusive treatment, indicate that she is
unable to make rational decisions about her living arrangements.” 149 The court went
on to state, “Without a conservator, there is no legal mechanism to stop the abuse,
given Frarck’s refusal to obtain a protective order.” 150
This focus on exiting the relationship as the test of competence and
agency 151 is highly problematic. A victim’s physical acts of remaining with an
abuser or seeking separation cannot be the test as to whether a victim is acting in her
own best interests. 152 Victims are competent, rational decision-makers, but the nature
of the relationship limits their choices. Their options are narrowed by the conditions
of the abusive relationship and possible consequences for violating the confines of
the relationship as established by the abuser.
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility are not particularly helpful
in determining when an attorney must take direction from the client. Rule 1.2
requires that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives
of representation,” 153 but the lawyer “may limit the scope of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent.” 154 Under Rule 1.2(d), “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
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assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may …counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.” 155 A lawyer cannot, for example, advise
a client to disregard a ruling of the court. 156
Rule 1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation provides that “a lawyer
shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw
from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in a violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law;” 157 and “[a] lawyer may withdraw
from representing a client if: withdrawal can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client” 158 or if “the client persists in a course of
conduct involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent; [t]he client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud; [t]he client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
[o]r other good cause for withdrawal exists.” 159
For the purposes of this paper, we are assuming that a lawyer who does not
wish to continue to represent a client who refuses to enforce a restraining order can
seek to withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16(b)(3) if the lawyer considers this decision to
be repugnant or imprudent or fundamentally disagrees with the refusal. It may be
that the court will not allow withdrawal. That situation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Rule 1.16 raises more salient questions: what is “a violation of the rules of
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professional conduct or other law?” 160 What is “a course of conduct involving the
lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent?” 161
What does it mean that the lawyer’s services are used to “perpetuate a crime or
fraud?” 162 Is the lawyer obligated to inform the court of the abuser’s violation of
restraining and protective orders? In Sarah’s case, we told Sarah that the violations
would likely arise and that she would have to testify truthfully, but we did not take
affirmative steps to advise the court of the violations. Had we done so, Sarah’s
husband would likely have been incarcerated. Sarah would have been safer, at the
expense of our ignoring our client’s directions.
One scholar has suggested that in some situations domestic violence
lawyers should break client confidentiality and request outside intervention from law
enforcement or others when the lawyer assesses that a victim is at risk of harm. 163
For support, she cites Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1), which
provides that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary…to prevent reasonably
certain death of substantial bodily harm.” 164 We have never contemplated going this
far outside of the bounds of the attorney-client relationship. For one, we do not
believe that an attorney is in a position to conduct risk assessments or make such
determinations based on “the facts and circumstances of the case” and the “intuition
of the lawyer.” 165 That conclusion, however, says little more than reaffirming our
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commitment to confidentiality. It does not answer the thornier question of the
lawyer’s responsibility to the client’s direction, the client’s safety, and the court.
There are different views on how lawyers approach clients and issues. We
believed, and continue to believe, in “client-centered lawyering.” We might have
treated this issue differently if we were “cause lawyers.” It may be helpful to consider
what it means to be a client-centered lawyer or a cause lawyer in the context of a
domestic violence case.

DIFFERENT LAWYERING MODELS
A.

Client-Centered Lawyering
Starting in the late 1970s, lawyers and law school clinics started to move

from a traditional lawyer-client relationship to an alternative “client-centered
model,” 166 encouraging students to develop meaningful relationships 167 with their
clients and depart from a traditionally paternalistic and adversarial approach to
litigation. 168 Over time, client-centered lawyering has increasingly focused on
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treating the client holistically, emphasizing problem-solving, and not just the client’s
immediate case.” 169
Client-centered lawyering has four primary components:
(1) it draws attention to the critical importance of non-legal aspects of a
client’s situation; (2) it places the lawyer’s role in the representation within
limitations set by a sharply circumscribed view of the lawyer’s professional
expertise; (3) it insists on the primacy of client decision-making; and (4) it
places a high value on the lawyers’ understanding their clients’
perspectives, emotions and values. 170
Client-centered lawyering seeks to place the client in control of the
attorney-client relationship and decision-making. Client-centered lawyering is a
model that “puts the attorney in the role of an open, accepting helper and leaves both
priority-setting and decision-making to the client. The lawyer helps the client
determine what is best for him in light of his own priorities.” 171 In client-centered
counseling, “the emphasis is on achieving the greatest client satisfaction.” 172
This model represents a diversion from the traditional paternalistic,
attorney-knows-best role that many attorneys adopt, where the decision-making is
based upon the attorney’s knowledge, priorities, and beliefs, rather than the client’s
interests. 173 Client-centered lawyering advocates suggest that the adversarial legal
system encourages attorneys to make choices on behalf of their clients that are
strategically wise, while failing to recognize the client’s interest in participating in
decision-making. Advocates believe the traditional approach is a product of the
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adversarial legal system and the approach toward lawyering that was taught in law
school. In contrast, in a client-centered lawyering relationship, “[t]he client does not
perceive himself as, and is not, an instrument to be manipulated by the lawyer.” 174
A client of a client-centered lawyer “directs his own destiny, relying on the lawyer
as a helper and as a guide through the legal labyrinths.” 175 This model “emphasizes
autonomy and individual growth” for the client. 176
Under the client-centered model, mutual trust between the parties will
empower the client to assume the dominant role of decision-maker, and the attorney
can adopt a more passive role as the client’s counselor. 177 The responsibility and
ability to develop mutual trust between the lawyer and client rests entirely on the
attorney, who is traditionally seen as being in control of the relationship. The lawyer
should place himself or herself in the client’s position, attempting to understand the
client’s situation and emotions. 178
A client-centered lawyer helps the client select the best course of action,
rather than merely outlining the options and instructing the client to pick the path of
his choice. Many scholars writing about client-centered lawyering use the term
“holistic” to describe the lawyer’s role within this model. 179 The lawyer remains
neutral and serves as a resource to the client during his decision-making process. 180
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While this model is intended to allow the client to make all decisions
autonomously, involving the lawyer only when necessary, some scholars believe this
cannot work in practice. 181 One critic argues that the differences between the clientcentered and traditional models are nonexistent when applied to everyday lawyering:
The client-centered literature fails to present even a single example in which
a lawyer sits down with a client and walks through alternative case theories
and their implications for the case and client. In this respect, the clientcentered approach differs little from the traditional approach, which
relegates virtually every decision about case theory to lawyers. 182
Other critics argue that clients are not in the best position to make legal decisions.
Instead, when a client hires you, they demonstrate “tacit willingness for you to make
lawyering skills decisions free from consultation” with them. 183
The difficulty is in the execution. Professor Jane Stoever writes about
teaching her students to be “client-centered and client-empowering advocates who
provide representation that enhances both a survivors’ safety and autonomy.” 184
Implicit in client-centered lawyering is that the client may reach a different decision
than the lawyer. Having fostered that autonomy, what do we do when autonomy and
safety diverge? Professors Susan Bryant and Maria Arias also discuss empowering
their clinic’s domestic violence clients as part of the clinic’s design. 185 Professors
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Bryant and Arias note that a client-centered approach “allows the students to see
patterns of oppression and…recognize the uniqueness of each client’s situation.” 186
They discuss a case in which the students determined that the client wanted to file
court papers seeking custody and a restraining order, which the students prepared,
but the client missed her appointment to sign the papers. The students later learned
through a social worker that the client, while afraid of her husband, was not ready to
pursue a legal remedy. 187 Professors Bryant and Arias note that the clinic’s client
empowerment “allows the client to participate in defining what a lawyer’s role
should be,” 188 and that in such a relationship, the lawyer’s role “changes with each
client because the lawyer alone does not set the professional boundaries.” 189
Professor Michelle Jacobs endorses client-based lawyering as a good model
for students, but states that a major weakness is the failure to address race, class, and
(to a lesser extent) gender in the attorney/client relationship. 190 Professor Jacobs
argues that the purpose of client-centered lawyering as a model is to “return the client
to the centrality of the lawyer’s work,” but that clients, particularly clients of color
(and women?) are still at the margins of the relationship. 191 She reminds us that
everyone – including lawyers, law students, and law professors – have preconceived
notions rooted in our cultural background. 192
In the domestic violence arena, our preconceived notions often center on
our difficulty in accepting that a victim of domestic violence remains with her abuser.
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A great deal of the literature on domestic violence tries to answer the question, “Why
do abused women stay?” As lawyers, we translate that question to “What can we do
to help our client leave?” As Professor Jacobs points out, only when we see the
client’s reality can we truly work with the client in a collaborative way. 193
Putting aside our preconceived notions does not answer our question of
limits, i.e. is there a point at which we cannot assist the client in relation to the court
or her own risky behavior, it does move us further down the road. In our case study,
this was the single most important factor in acting as we did.
B.

Cause Lawyering
As Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold have noted, “providing a single,

cross culturally valid definition of the concept [of cause lawyering] is impossible.” 194
Writing on the intersections of race, space, and poverty, Tom Calmore writes that
“cause lawyering encompasses various law-related activities, from rights assertion
to legal counseling, that relies on law-related means to achieve social justice for
individuals and subordinated or disadvantaged groups.” 195 Stuart Scheingold
describes “Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle,” 196 Richard Abel writes that “the
moments when law offers leverage to the relatively powerless as well as those when
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it is wielded, or trumped, by power” are “occasions for cause lawyering,” 197 and
Thomas Hilbink, reviewing Sarat and Scheingold, comments on the definitional
difficulty, noting that “belief in a cause and a desire to advance that cause are the
forces that drive cause lawyering actions” for cause lawyers, but “[h]ow does one
determine what fits within the rubric?” 198 Ann Southworth, one of the few scholars
who has examined the right’s response to the historic left-leaning cause lawyering,
shows that the “cause” in cause lawyering can be broad indeed, and virtually every
progressive cause lawyer now has a conservative counterpart. 199 Today, for every
cause, we can be confident that there are cause lawyers on every side of the issue.
Cause lawyering in the field of domestic violence can take a variety of
approaches. Karen Czapanskiy notes that “women lawyers and law professors were
the first to construct the issue as a legal problem,” partly as a consequence of the
identification of the battering of women as an issue affecting women’s liberation.
Feminist women lawyers were instrumental in developing the theory and legal
regime addressing domestic violence issues. 200 These efforts took a variety of forms,
including criminal defense, 201 family law in both legal services offices 202 and private
practice, 203 state and federal legislative efforts to establish governmental intervention
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on behalf of domestic violence victims, a remarkably successful effort resulting in
restraining order statutes and other protections in every state, 204 as well as the
passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 and reauthorizations
in 2000, 2005, and 2013. 205
Still, even without reaching the push-back by “men’s rights” organizations
against domestic violence protections, 206 today’s domestic violence lawyers may
agree on the cause, but not necessarily the approach. Twenty years after Professor
Czapanskiy’s article, feminist attorneys still play a major role in representing
individual clients in domestic violence cases, but the advocacy community is split
into those who support and those who oppose mandatory arrest.
Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecutions have placed prosecutors in a
more prominent role. As Deborah Epstein has noted, activists have focused on
“transforming the responses of police, prosecutors, and the courts.” 207 Legal reforms
include warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecutions, and temporary
orders with substantial implications and few procedural protections. 208
Donna Wills, a veteran family violence prosecutor in Los Angeles, has
written that she “firmly believe[s]” that an aggressive no-drop and no-dismissal
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policy “is the enlightened approach to domestic violence prosecutions.” 209 Wills
approaches domestic violence through a cause lawyer’s lens, stating that it is a
societal problem, not just an individual or private problem, with a strong State
interest in maintaining public safety. In focusing on the State interest, Wills expands
the protective umbrella to include children as secondary victims. 210 To Wills (and
other supporters of mandatory arrest and no-drop policies), these policies prevent
batterers from controlling the justice system through their victims. 211 Under this
approach, the domestic violence victim is best protected by having no power, with
decision-making resting with the State, in the form of the police and prosecutor.
As Wills admits, there is no evidence that mandatory arrest and no-drop
policies reduce the incidence of domestic violence. 212 Betsy Tsai, a Domestic
Violence Resource Coordinator for the New York City Courts, notes that criminal
justice system employees are “frustrated and embarrassed by their inability to protect
victims of domestic violence,” and suggests that the court system should look toward
specialized domestic violence courts. 213 The specialized courts incorporate
therapeutic jurisprudence, a multidisciplinary effort to provide comprehensive
services. 214 Therapeutic jurisprudence is a reaction to the inevitable mental health
and psychological functioning of the participants in the legal system. 215 In practice,
a therapeutic approach would include a supportive and informative environment to
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the victim, victim and witness advocates, police training, more careful monitoring of
defendant compliance with court orders, and participation in intervention programs
for abusers. 216 This does not mean that the victim regains control of the decisions
that so dramatically affect her life. In many jurisdictions employing a therapeutic
jurisprudence system, the State, not the victim, controls the case. 217

WHEN PRIVATE RIGHTS BECOME PUBLIC AND COURTS INTERVENE
In the Mary Adkins/Elizabeth Tullis g-chat, Elizabeth Tullis says that “once
you enter the criminal law system, it’s not just the interest of the victim, but of society
that is at issue. Going into the system, you marshal the resources of the state to protect
you, but you also cede some control of the case to the State.” Mary and Elizabeth
raise the question of whether private rights become public once a victim seeks state
intervention. Does society have an independent interest in enforcing the restraining
order?
Courts have allowed the public interest to transcend private choices,
including forced feeding in prisons, 218 and forced medical care to children, even in
the face of religious opposition by the child’s parents. 219 The commonality in these
cases is the likelihood of harm, and the public interest in preventing that harm. The
question, when it comes to domestic violence cases, is the extent to which we are
comfortable predicting future violence, and whether or not our conclusions should
affect our representation of clients who are at risk. In the area of domestic violence,
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the rationale behind mandatory arrest policies and forced testimony combines the
notions of many of the themes of this paper, including a patronizing view of
protecting the victim from her inability to protect herself, a reformist attitude of
treating all cases uniformly, and the criminalization of domestic violence and the
transfer of decision-making to the State. The question is whether State involvement,
either through civil or criminal process, turns a private domestic violence matter into
a public issue.
As we discussed earlier, several courts have sanctioned women or forced
them to testify when the women refused to cooperate with the State in pursuing
domestic violence remedies or testifying in criminal matters. Implicit in these
decisions is a belief that the right to withdraw from civil or criminal prosecution has
been supplanted by State interests. To get a sense of judicial reasoning in these cases,
it helps to look at death penalty cases, where the issue of public rights trumping the
private attorney-client relationship has arisen prominently.
In 1987, a Connecticut court sentenced Michael Ross to death, after he
confessed to murdering eight women. 220 He fought execution for 17 years, but
ultimately withdrew all appeals and requested that the execution go forward, 221
starting a new proceeding questioning whether a defendant can rationally and
competently choose to die, and whether the public has a right to contest an execution.
The Chief Public Defender’s office sought to intervene in Ross’s case, arguing that
Ross was trying to commit “judicial, state-assisted suicide,” an argument based on
Ross’s alleged incompetence to make the decision to consent to the execution. 222
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Ross’s former lawyer, the Office of the Public Defender, argued that Ross’s
execution would make executions “more socially and politically” acceptable, an
issue of great importance to the Public Defender’s other clients facing execution. 223
The Public Defender’s prediction was almost certainly correct, but this is
not how attorneys usually act.

Rule 1.9(1) of the Code of Professional

Responsibility 224 explicitly prohibited the Public Defender from representing an
interest adverse to Ross, and Rule 1.9(2) explicitly prohibited using information
obtained during representation against Ross’s interests. 225 How, then, could the
Public Defender use its knowledge of Ross’s mental condition as the basis for legal
actions that, in the words of Ross’s subsequent attorney, T.R. Paulding, “are contrary
to the defendant’s wishes or desires”? 226 The answer—and this is not much of an
answer—is that some issues raise public as well as private rights.
Ross understood the incongruous nature of the proceedings, stating on his
web site that “I fully support their position and efforts to bring about the abolition of
capital punishment in this State…But I do have a problem when they interfere with
my personal decisions…to resolve this case in a manner that I believe will harm the
least number of people…These are decisions that I and I alone must make.” 227 Ross
objected to the actions of the Public Defender, stating “what I’m hoping is that
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January 26, I will be executed. I just don’t understand why the public defenders can’t
understand that. I mean, it’s so simple. And it’s my damned decision.” 228
Ross’s sister and father each filed separate next-friend actions, his sister
arguing that Ross was not mentally competent to waive his rights, and his father
arguing that his rights were being violated because he could not “volunteer” to be
executed. 229 The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Robert Chatigny, who
raised concerns about the competency claims. 230

Paulding argued that Ross

understood the appeals process, was knowledgeable about death penalty law, and
was choosing to forego appeals. 231 He stated that Ross “had made a logical, rational
decision. He needed a voice in our court system…I think I’m an attorney before I’m
a defense attorney…I think your duty, your basic duty as an attorney, is to represent
your client.” 232
Judge Chatigny tried to persuade Paulding to pursue an appeal despite
Ross’s expressed wishes of his client, 233 telling him, “what you are doing is terribly,
terribly wrong. No matter how well motivated you are, you have a client whose
competence is in serious doubt and you don’t know what you are talking about,” 234
that failure to pursue an appeal was malpractice, 235 and threatening to go after
Paulding’s license to practice law if future evidence showed that Ross was not
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competent. 236 Paulding got the message, and filed motions for another competency
hearing in state court. The state court held that Ross was mentally competent to
waive future appeals and proceed to his execution. 237 He was executed on May 13,
2005. 238
In 1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court, considering a similar question,
explicitly transformed the defendant’s rights into a public question, holding that
appeals of a death sentence were mandatory and could not be waived, 239 stating that
the public interest “transcends the preferences of individual defendants.” 240 Like
Ross, John Martini requested that his execution proceed as scheduled and that his
public defender not pursue post-conviction relief. In proceeding with a postconviction review, the Court noted that:
It is difficult to explain why a murderer who has admitted his guilt and had
his conviction and sentence of death affirmed on direct appeal should not
be granted his request to be executed immediately. For some, no
explanation may be necessary. For others, no explanation will suffice. For
those who wish to understand, we explain that under our form of
government it is not the inmate on death row or the accused who determines
when and whether the State shall execute a prisoner; rather, the law itself
makes that determination. The public has an interest in the reliability and
integrity of a death sentencing decision that transcends the preferences of
individual defendants. 241
The Court recognized that its view was not universal:
We acknowledge that other jurisdictions do not recognize the standing of
one such as the Public Defender to prosecute a post-conviction relief
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application on behalf of a death row inmate who does not seek their
assistance. It is a natural reaction for some to wish to be rid of an admitted
murderer who asks to be executed. The Court is nonetheless required to
ensure the integrity of death sentences in New Jersey. 242
Martini changed his mind, and requested that his Public Defender pursue
any available remedies. 243 He was subsequently convicted of three additional
murders in Pennsylvania and Arizona. 244 On July 26, 2006, The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld Martini’s death sentence, but New Jersey had imposed a moratorium
on the death penalty six months earlier. 245 Martini died in prison in 2009. 246
Does the “public right” principle apply to domestic violence cases? As
Elizabeth Tullis noted, when a victim obtains a restraining order, not to mention a
protective order, she cedes some authority to the State. Do we, as lawyers, cede a
part of our relationship with our clients?
We are trained as lawyers to separate ourselves from the consequences to
third parties of our representation. Criminal defense attorneys accept that they are
representing the accused, not the victim, society, or the hypothetical future victim.
Attorneys representing a parent in a dependency and neglect case take direction from
the parent, regardless of qualms about the child’s future care. In domestic violence
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cases, we accept that there are valid reasons why women do not leave the abuser, and
that additional abuse may, and often does, occur during the representation. There is
a different quality to a case in which a client is using the lawyer’s legal services to
avoid a court order meant to protect her. Is there a point at which this becomes a
public right, enforceable by the state?
While it is rare, victims, having obtained restraining orders, have been
charged with violating those orders, while some courts have struck down the charges
against the victim as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 247 The analogy to death cases may be useful on a lethality scale, but
falters when considering the competing interests of the victim. When law
enforcement intervenes and penalizes the victim for violating a restraining order
against her abuser, the focus of the legal system shifts from the abuser to the victim
and “the abuser is not held fully accountable.” 248 The victim is prosecuted for
inviting her abuser back into her life—often for a legitimate purpose, such as to
discuss childcare or request financial assistance. 249
When a civil restraining order can be enforced against either party, the
purposes of the restraining order system are undermined. Victims will be less likely
to report abuse for fear any action on theirs will be used against them; abusers could
use the restraining orders as continued ploys against their battered victims; and the
blame for the abuse shifts from the batterer to the battered.
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In the abstract, the public enforcement of restraining orders, like mandatory
arrest policies, has advantages. However, in the context of domestic violence, the
public’s interest in the victim’s well-being is not so black and white.

The

enforcement of the restraining order may serve the public good of protecting the
victim, but if the means necessary for that enforcement further victimizes the battered
woman and provides a disincentive for victims to report abuse at all, then we need
to question whether the benefit of enhanced enforcement outweighs the inherent
value of client-based decision-making.
We are concerned about our clients’ safety and we try to advise them as best
we can, but we are not in the business of predicting future harm. Others, however,
are. Predicting behavior and lethality assessments are increasingly a part of law
enforcement and safety planning, and it is useful to take a look at this field.

RISK AND LETHALITY ASSESSMENT AND THE PREDICTABILITY
OF VIOLENCE (AND DOES IT MATTER?)
Legal scholars have devoted a good deal of effort to the question of
character evidence and how it can help predict behavior. Much of the discussion
starts with G.W. Allport, a psychologist, a founder of “trait theory.” Allport believed
that traits were the most fundamental building blocks of personality. 250 Trait theorists
believed that traits were stable and enduring, and produced generally consistent
behavior over a variety of situations. 251 In the realm of trait theory, a person who
lies in one situation will lie in other situations; a person who is violent in one
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circumstance will likely be violent in other circumstances. 252 Trait theory would
allow us to predict behavior, including criminal behavior.
Empirical research did not support the trait theorists. 253 Walter Mischel
found that “behavior depends on stimulus situations and is specific to the situation:
response patterns even in highly similar situations often fail to be strongly
related.” 254 However, between 1968 and 1995, Mischel, along with his colleague,
Yuichi Shoda, modified his views on character traits and predictability. Mischel and
Shoda assert that we can develop a fuller personality profile that includes a variety
of psychological ingredients, one that could successfully predict particularized
behavior. 255
More recently, Professor Edward Imwinkelried asserted that most recent
studies agree that predicting behavior based on interactions between character traits
and situations is more accurate than predictions based on either traits or situations. 256
Since legal scholarship on predictability revolves around the admissibility in court
of character evidence, a theory “more accurate” is different from “more likely than
not,” and is not going to result in reconsidering long-standing rules of evidence. The
question here, however, is whether predictability should inform our representation
of vulnerable clients.
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Domestic violence is a subset within the broader category of violent crime.
Many people, including Congress, believe that crimes of sexual violence and child
molestation deserve special treatment. To the chagrin of many judges, lawyers, and
scholars, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow the admission
of past similar acts in criminal cases in which the defendant is accused of sexual
assault 257 or child molestation, 258 and to allow the admission of past similar actions
for civil actions involving sexual assault or child molestation. 259 In a Report
submitted to Congress in 1995, the Judicial Conference requested that Congress
reconsider Rules 413, 414, and 415, reporting overwhelming opposition. Two years
later, Katharine Baker wrote that “Advocates of Rule 413…unabashedly and without
proof suggest that rapists are more likely than other criminals to repeat their acts.
The evidence that we have is to the contrary.” 260 According to studies by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, recidivism for drug offenses, larceny/theft, burglary, and
robbery are all much higher than rape, sexual assault, and child molestation. In fact,
only homicide is lower. 261
That did not deter Congress or the State legislatures of California and
Illinois, both of which amended their rules of evidence to allow prior acts of domestic
violence in cases in which the victim was murdered. 262 California acted in response
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to the O.J. Simpson acquittal and Illinois just prior to the Scott Peterson trial, which
culminated in a conviction.
The history of predicting criminal behavior is, at best, a cautionary tale. The
ancient Greeks, including Aristotle, believed in physiognomy, the ability to predict
human character by physical appearance. In the 19th Century, phrenologists believed
they could predict future criminal behavior by certain bumps on an individual’s head.
Phrenology was considered by many intellectuals to be a real science. Bram Stoker
in Dracula and Arthur Conan Doyle in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes both refer
to phrenology with approval. No less than Holmes himself, the epitome of rational
thought, authoritatively states that a new acquaintance is intelligent, based on the
size of his skull.
Recent popular culture has focused more on the supernatural. In 1956,
Philip K. Dick published The Minority Report, a short story in which psychics who
are able to see the future help the police to prevent murders before the occur. 263 The
“Precrime” unit arrests future perpetrators, who are punished for the crimes they
would have committed. Dick placed his story 100 years in the future. The story was
made into a 2002 movie, with Tom Cruise playing Dick’s 50 year old, balding, outof-shape director of “Precrime,” the organization charged with arresting criminals
before they commit their crime. 264 In the television show The Profiler, the
protagonist, who works for the FBI as a forensic analyst, is particularly effective
because of her ability to see through the eyes of others. The more recent trend,
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however, is toward a real-world ability to predict crime, through computer-assisted
analysis, as in Person of Interest, or mathematics, as in Numbers.
The real world has caught up, and predicting future crimes has entered the
mainstream. The Santa Cruz, California police department is using “predictive”
software, using an algorithm similar to the program used to predict earthquake
aftershocks. 265 Based on the findings of Santa Clara Assistant Professor George
Mohler that offenders tend to return to the scene of past successes, the software
predicts the location where another crime is likely to occur. 266 On April 12, 2012,
CBS News reported that Los Angeles joined the “predictive policing” movement,
with officers patrolling computer-generated hot spots to prevent crimes before they
occurred. 267 These and similar efforts are mundane when compared to the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Future Attribute Screening Technology
(FAST) program.
FAST’s goal, as stated in a December 2011 DHS privacy impact
assessment, is to “determine whether technology can enable the identification and
interpretation of a screened subject’s physiological and behavioral cues or signatures
without the need for operator-induced stimuli which, in turn, will allow for security
personnel to remotely (and therefore, more safely) identify cues diagnostic of
malintent (defined as the intent to cause harm).” 268 In other words, FAST has been
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created to identify criminals before they commit crimes, and it is no surprise that
DHS identifies FAST as a “pre-crime” system,” or that many commentators have
compared it to Minority Report and Person of Interest. 269
Causation and prediction hold a great deal of interest in the domestic
violence field. Domestic violence counselors are well-acquainted with the Power
and Control Wheel, developed in 1984 by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project
in Duluth, Minnesota. 270 The Wheel is a diagnostic tool to help characterize and
explain abusive relationships, including domestic violence, and its use has become
part of the culture of identifying abusive relationship and counseling victims. 271
As described by its founders, the Wheel is used in a variety of settings,
including assisting battered women to see how their abusers’ tactics are used against
them and better understand the batterers’ control, to counsel men to identify their
own behavior, and to train law enforcement on the nature of the abusive relationships
and to better understand why women may not want to leave the relationship. 272 The
Power and Control Wheel is probably the most commonly used interpretive tool in
the field of intimate violence, but it rarely, if ever, is used to predict violence.
One of the earliest and best-known tools for predicting lethality is Jacquelyn
Campbell’s Danger Assessment (DA), first developed in 1985, and revised several
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times since. 273 It consists of a two-step assessment to determine a woman’s lethality
risk. First, the woman is presented with a calendar on which she documents all
incidents of abuse during the previous twelve months. This allows the victim to see
a graphical depiction of her abuse and illustrates the abuser’s patterns of abuse.
Second, the woman answers a series of twenty yes-or-no questions. The greater the
number of “yes” responses, the greater the woman’s risk of being killed by her
battering intimate partner. The Danger Assessment is easily accessed, and women
or those assisting them can complete can complete it online. 274 A shorter, elevenquestion Danger Assessment test is also available for law enforcement use when
responding to domestic disputes or battering incidents. 275
In the 1980’s, Gavin de Becker developed the MOSAIC Threat Assessment
System, which, in its current computer-assisted form, is used by law enforcement
agencies, including the Supreme Court Police and U.S. Capitol Police, to assess
threats to public figures and others. 276 De Becker developed different MOSAIC
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systems for a variety of situations, including domestic violence. De Becker argues
that “[s]pousal homicide is the single most predictable serious crime in America….
[T]here is an urgent need to help police, prosecutors, and victims systematically
evaluate cases to identify those with the ingredients of true danger.” 277 De Becker’s
domestic violence tool is MOSAIC-20, a computer program that helps police to
evaluate cases to identify those in which the danger of homicide is highest.
In 1997, Gavin de Becker published The Gift of Fear and Other Survival
Signs that Protect Us from Violence. 278 The Gift of Fear was lauded by commentators
from Oprah Winfrey to Marcia Clark to many domestic violence victims who felt
that the book spoke to their experiences. 279 Even those reviewers who did not like
the writing or felt that De Becker was a pompous self-promoter praised the book’s
message. 280 The Gift of Fear spent four months on the New York Times best-seller
list and was the #1 non-fiction seller of 1997. 281 It was followed by other successful
De Becker books on fear and security. 282 Oprah now offers De Becker’s MOSAIC20 free of charge on her website, touting it as “the tool that could save your life.” 283
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The Danger Assessment and MOSAIC-20 are designed to predict lethal
violence or “extreme dangerousness.” 284

There are other risk assessment

instruments, such as the Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence (KSID) and the Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI), which were designed
to diagnose the risk of repeat assault at any level. 285 Other instruments that assess
risk of reassault include the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment (SARA) 286 and the
Ontario Domestic Violence Risk Assessment (ODARA). 287
The Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence (K-SID) was
developed in 1998 by Richard Gelles. The K-SID method is a ten-question survey
that is provided to both the victim and abuser and is comprised of three parts: (1) a
poverty chart; (2) a severity and injury index; and (3) ten risk markers: poverty, age,
drugs/alcohol, domestic violence in family of origin, witness to domestic violence as
a child, marital status, child abuse by defendant, education, employment, previous
domestic violence arrests, and violations of protective orders. The test scores the
batterer as being at a low, moderate, high, or very high “risk of reoffending.” If a
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batterer has a previous domestic violence arrest or has violated a protective order,
they are automatically classified as being at a “very high” risk of reoffense. 288
The Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI) includes twelve
questions that are intended to indicate the batterer’s level of dangerousness. Like
the K-SID, this method is not widely available for public use. 289 The DVSI is based
upon information received from the abuser, rather than the victim, which
differentiates it from the Danger Assessment or DV-MOSAIC methods. 290

The

DVSI is administered when a domestic violence offender makes initial contact with
criminal justice professionals, or at the beginning of his probation. The offender is
then classified at a particular risk level. Where the DVSI is used, it can serve as a
tool during the supervision of the offender or the provision of specific services to the
offender and victim. 291
In 2005, the National Institute of Justice surveyed the accuracy of the four
primary lethality assessment methods: DA, DV-MOSAIC, DVSI, and K-SID. The
National Institute of Justice report indicates that, overall, “all four of the risk
assessment tools were significantly related to subsequent severity of abuse, but not
very highly related.” 292 A study of DVSI usage between 2003-2007 found that the

288

Jan Roehl & Kristin Guertin, Intimate Partner Violence: The Current Use of Risk
Assessments in Sentencing Offenders, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 171, 179, 181 (2000); see also
Harrington Conner, supra note 125, at 920.
289
Harrington Conner, supra note 125, at 920.
290
Id.
291
See Kirk R. Williams & Stephen R. Grant, Empirically Examining the Risk of
Intimate Partner Violence: The Revised Domestic Violence Screening Instrument
(DVSI-R), 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 400 (2006).
292
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME, VIOLENCE & VICTIMIZATION
RESEARCH DIVISION’S COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1993-2011, at 2B (2012). Jill Theresa Messing et al., Collaborating With Police
Departments: Recruitment in the Oklahoma Lethality Assessment (Ok-LA) Study, 17
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (2011).

69

IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES

predictive value recidivism of the DVSI across all risk groups was not statistically
significant. 293
The very existence of lethality and risk assessment tools reveals distrust in
domestic violence victims’ ability to understand their situations or predict their risk
of being reassaulted or murdered. These instruments arise from the belief that “most
people do a poor job of evaluating their own risk for negative outcomes.” 294 Some
researchers believe that domestic violence victims are deficient in recognizing
danger in domestic violence relationships. 295 Other commentators believe that
victims cannot predict future violence even with the aid of risk assessment
instruments because “there is no real way to predict unpredictable behavior.” 296
Contrary to the claims of the various risk assessment tools, victims are
generally the best predictors of their own risk of being seriously injured. 297 Victims
have a unique ability to predict the violence and anticipate the degree of violence. 298
Studies show that domestic violence victims’ ratings of their risk of future violence
committed by an intimate partner are fairly accurate. 299 Almost 65% of domestic
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violence victims accurately predict their risk of reassault. 300 Victims may not
accurately predict lethal violence, however. In one study, only approximately half
of victims of intimate partner homicide or attempted homicide recognized that their
abusers were capable of killing them. 301
In judging risk, victims use different factors than those utilized by risk
assessment tools, including interpretations of the abuser’s moods, facial expressions,
speech patterns, and verbal threats. 302 They also rely on abuser personality traits and
dynamic factors like the abuser’s ability to find the victim and his desire for
revenge. 303 These factors are difficult for risk assessment tools to capture. Victims
also will rely on some of the same factors used by assessment tools to predict
violence, including the status of the relationship, the history of violence in the
relationship, and substance use. 304 Some of the instruments’ primary indicators –
like the abuser’s criminal history, the abuser being in a stepparent role, or the
presence of stepchildren in the home – play almost no role in victim prediction. 305
Studies have shown that victims’ perceptions of the risk of reassault using these
factors and others improve predictions of reassault by the risk assessment
instruments. 306
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In fact, lethality assessments generally incorporate the victim’s own
assessment of risk, bolstering the effectiveness of the instrument. For example, the
first risk factor listed for MOSAIC 20 is “The woman has intuitive feelings that she
is at risk.” 307 This factor is the only one to appear in italics, adding emphasis to its
importance to the assessment. The final factor for MOSAIC 20 is: “His wife/partner
fears he will injure or kill her. She has discussed this with others or has made plans
to be carried out in the event of her death.” 308 Like the first factor, this factor supports
the importance of victim prediction in risk assessment and incorporates victim
prediction into the instrument. Campbell’s Danger Assessment also incorporates
victim risk assessment into its instrument. The eighteenth factor in the Danger
Assessment is “Do you believe he is capable of killing you?” 309 Studies show that
incorporating the victim’s assessment of danger improves instrument prediction. 310
One study revealed that victims’ perceptions of risk were better at
predicting reassault than the K-SID but that the Danger Assessment was more
accurate at predicting reassault than the victims themselves. 311 With these outcomes
in mind, the authors of the study found that women’s perceptions of risk are a
“reasonably accurate predictor of reassault.” 312 Interestingly the study found that a
victim’s risk was to some extent determined by the victim’s perception of the risk.
The victims who were at greatest risk of future harm were those who felt somewhat
safe and therefore did not take proactive action, such as separating from the abuser

307

MOSAIC, https://www.mosaicmethod.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
Id.
309
DANGER ASSESSMENT, http://www.dangerassessment.org (last visited Mar. 2,
2014).
310
Weisz et al., supra note 297, at 86; Heckert & Gondolf, supra note 306, at 797.
311
Heckert & Gondolf, supra note 306, at 796-797.
312
Id. at 796.
308

72

JOURNAL NAME

[VOL. :NNN

or safety planning, to ensure safety. 313 Victims who felt safe, victims who felt like
they were in danger, and victims who did not know whether they were at risk were
less likely to be reassaulted. 314
It is not the purpose of this paper to opine on whether MOSAIC-20, the
DVSI, or any other instrument can accurately predict serious or lethal intimate
partner violence (nor do we have the capacity to do so), but it is fair to assume that
these efforts will become increasingly sophisticated, and the implications are
dramatic. The notion of law enforcement profiling as a preventative tool is wellestablished, and there is a great deal of literature on the value, or lack thereof, of
profiling. Our question is different. Even assuming that the perfect profiling tool
exists, does it affect the attorney-client relationship? Put another way, when we talk
about the attorney-client relationship, particularly in the context of client-centered
lawyering, we take for granted that the lawyer takes direction from the competent
client. Can we maintain that presumption if we believe MOSAIC-20 is an accurate
assessor and MOSAIC-20 tells us that an abuser is about to commit “the single most
predictable serious crime in America?” 315
Murder can be the ultimate form of control. Through the threat of murder,
the abuser leverages everything the victim has – her access to work, her children,
and the world. Prior domestic violence is the single greatest predictor of femicide
by an intimate partner. In one study, seventy percent of female murder victims had
been physically abused by the same intimate partner who killed them. 316 Thirty-nine
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percent of all femicides, and probably even more, are committed by an intimate
partner. 317 In another study, domestic violence homicide victims had experienced
violence within 30 days of the homicide, some within a day or two before the
homicide. 318
Most domestic violence attorneys fear that the next news item about
domestic violence homicide will feature one of their clients. While attorneys should
be concerned about the potential for lethal violence against their clients, this fear is
misdirected. The lawyer’s own worries about her role or responsibility in the client’s
safety must give way to the client’s interests.

CONCLUSION
We approached this paper as practicing lawyers and clinical teachers,
looking at a problem that domestic violence victims and advocates face every day.
Given the many vagaries of the Rules of Professional Responsibility and the basic
agency role of the lawyer, it is not surprising that our own discipline offered little
help. Does anything else matter? We think that is a fair question.
In writing this paper, we have come full circle. The project started with a
post hoc reflection of our actions in Sarah’s case. As is evident from the paper, each
question led to new questions, some of which were unexpected. All domestic
violence practitioners are conscious of the nightmare scenario inherent in their cases,
and we are no different. We are aware that Sarah’s case could have turned out
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differently. That is a sobering thought, and, in the clinical context, we asked
ourselves whether students should be put into the position of being in the front lines
of a case that has the potential to be so devastating.
In the end, we came back to where we started. While we do not discount
the effect of a positive result for the client on our views, we believe strongly that our
commitment to our client included the trust in her ability and judgment to make the
decision to argue that her husband should not be incarcerated, and that our
commitment to our students included sharing the full responsibilities of our
representation. In making the latter conclusion, we are informed—and impressed—
by our students’ views. We discussed these issues with them, and as is evident from
their g-chat, they discussed the issues with each other. That said, we have three
caveats.
First, we and our students benefitted from a multi-disciplinary approach,
which included classes by psychiatrists and social workers on the nature of domestic
violence, along with the opportunity to consult with the same professionals on cases.
We encouraged students to use these opportunities to talk about their own concerns,
and provided the opportunity to do so in confidential settings. This is not a luxury;
we think it is a critical part of clinical work in domestic violence.
Second, we cannot underestimate that benefit to both clients and students
of having students working on the same case for at least two semesters, with the
opportunity to continue longer, especially for the purpose of continuing with an
existing client. During our representation of Sarah, our students prepared, filed,
mediated, and litigated motions and the trial; defended an appeal; prepared and filed
a successful petition for Innocent Spouse tax relief; negotiated forbearance on a
mortgage foreclosure; negotiated forbearance and obtained a court-ordered title
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transfer on an automobile; talked with accountants, bankers, psychiatrists, social
workers, victim advocates, court mediators, and lawyers; and generally lived with
the case throughout law school. They appeared in court numerous times, before four
judges, and, by the time the graduated, were greeted warmly in the courthouse by
state marshals, family relations advisors, and court clerks. As Sarah mentioned
several times, the relationship she built with Mary and Sarah provided relief at times
of stress. It would have been difficult to change students every semester.
Third, as Professor Carey has written elsewhere, 319 we continue to believe
in the need to provide holistic services, with a full range of legal services. We believe
our obligation to our client is to use our skills to try to solve her problems and our
obligation to our students is to teach the skills necessary to make that effort. There
are cases that conclude with the granting of a restraining order, but many cases
involve other family issues as well as collateral legal issues arising from the breakup
of the relationship. If we are truly committed to teaching best practices, we need to
be willing to provide the highest quality services. In the case of domestic violence,
obtaining a restraining order without resolving child custody, support, and other
critical family issues will inevitably leave many clients at a loss. When we limit our
representation in this way, we start from the proposition that we are not intending to
resolve the client’s problem. The message to students is that skills are enough. We
should be striving for higher standards.
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